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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
BILLS AND NoTms-Daxwmt BOUND TO KNOW His OWN CHEc.-This is a suit
brought by the United States to recover the difference between the amount to
which a check paid by it had been fraudulently raised and the amount for which
the check was drawn. Held, That a check by a government disbursing clerk
upon the Treasurer of the United States is a check by the United States upon
themselves, within the rule that the drawer can not recover for an overpayment
to an innocent payee. United States of America v. The National Exchange
Bank of Baltimore (U. S., May, 1926) 70 L. Ed., 427.
The principle that a drawee of a bill is bound to know the drawer's signature,
and that in the event that the drawee pays a forged instrument he can not re-
cover from an innocent payee is fundamental in the law of Bills and Notes.
United States v. Chase National Bank, 252 U. S. 485, 64 L. Ed., 675. The
government plaintiff does not dispute this principle, but insists that, although
acceptance of a check or draft does vouch for the signature of the drawer, it
does not vouch for the body of the instrument. Espy v. First National Bank,
18 Wall., 604, 21 L. Ed., 947; White v. Continental Nat. Bank, 64 N. Y. 316;
National City Bank v. Westcott Express Co., 6 N. Y. St. Rep., 726. The govern-
ment further contends that the drawer and drawee of a check were not the
same in such sense as to charge the drawee with knowledge of the amount of
the check. In this event the right of a party, paying money to another under a bona
fide forgetfulness or ignorance of facts, to recover it back from one who is
not entitled to receive it, is well established. The equitable action for money
had and received will lie against one who has received money which in con-
science does not belong to him. Kelly v. Solar, 9 M. & W., 54; Bank of
Orleans v. Smith, 3 Hill, 560. It is, however, well established that if the drawer
and drawee are the same the drawee can not recover for an over-payment to
an innocent payee, for he is bound to know his own checks. United States Bank
v. Georgia Bank, 23 U. S. (10 Wheaton), 333, 6 L. Ed., 334; National Park
Bank v. Fourth National Bank, 7 Abb. Prac. (N. S.), 138. In the case of a
check drawn by the government upon itself, as in this case, there is no doubt
that the drawer is also the drawee. U. S. Bank v. Georgia Bank, Supra. Another
view taken by the government in an attempt to escape being both the drawer
and drawee is that the hand that drew and the hand that was to pay were not
the same. Such a theory can not be well entertained for the government in its
multitude of business dealings through its various agents must be held to the
same responsibility as other principles. E. C. F. '27.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POwER-BuSINESs AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC
INTEREST-REGULATING FmRE INSURANCE RATEs.-The case under discussion in-
volves the constitutionality of two Missouri statutes-Sections 6283 and 6284
of Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919. These acts vest the State Insurance
Commissioner with authority to effect such reductions on fire insurance pre-
miums, subject to review by the state courts, as will permit reasonable profits to
those fire indemnity companies operating within this state. The portion of
section 6283 pertinent to this case follows: "The superintendent of insurance
upon written complaint of any citizen, or upon his own motion, is hereby im-
powered to investigate the necessity of a reduction of rates, and if upon such in-
vestigation it appears that the result of such earnings in this state of the stock
fire insurance companies for five years next preceding such investigation shows
there has been an aggregate profit therein in excess of what is reasonable, he
shall order such reduction of rates as shall be necessary to limit the aggregate
collections by insurance companies in this state to no more than a reasonable
profit." The respondent, State Insurance Commissioner, in pursuance of this
statute ordered a ten per cent reduction on all fire insurance rates, alleging
exorbitant profits. The petitioners then filed their petition praying the court
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to set aside the order of the commissioner. The circuit court upheld the order
of the respondent, and upon appeal the Supreme Court of Missouri sustained
the decision of the lower court, thereby upholding the validity of the statute.
Aetna Insurance Company v. Hyde, (Mo. 1926), 285 S. W. 65.
The fact that the case by writ of certiorari is now pending before the Supreme.
Court of the United States renders a discussion at this time very appropriate.
In substance, the issue involved is whether a state statute that delegated to a
public official authority to regulate fire insurance rates is repugnant to the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is a well settled principle
that to deprive a person, artificial or natural, of its "good will," its "going con-
cern value," or to injure one's established business, is sufficient to constitute a
confiscation of private property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That the "due process" clause is deemed also to embrace freedom of
contract to all persons is held in C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. z. McGuine, 219 U. S.,
566; Wulff Packing Company v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S., 534. Ever since
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113, it has been held by the Supreme Court of the
United States that any business "affected with a public interest" is subject to
legislative regulation. The following businesses have been held to be "clothed
with a public interest" and therefore subject to regulation: warehouses and
grain elevators, Munn v. Illinois, supra, stockyards, Cotting v. Kansas City
Stock Yards, 183 U. S., 79, tenement and apartment houses, Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 Fed., 306, transportation of freight and passengers,
C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S., 155. In American Surety Co. v. Shal-
lenberger, 183 Fed., 636, it was held that the insurance business consists of per-
sonal contracts of indemnity against certain contingencies only, and that whether
such contracts should be made at all is a matter of private negotiation, demand-
ing exclusive freedom in fixing the terms. But, says Dean Pound, "The law of
insurance is so far regarded as a business in which the public has an interest
that within recent years the insurance business has been taken out of the cate-
gory of contracts." (POUND, SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, p. 29.) That the
business of fire insurance is one in which the public has such an interest as to
justify legislative regulation of its rates has been repeatedly held. Orient Fire
Insurance v. Daggs, 172 U. S., 565; Farmers' & Merchants' Insurance Com-
pany v. Dohney, 189 U. S.. 301; Bashier v. Connally, 113 U. S., 27; and par-
ticularly, German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S., 389. It is quite
probable that in the instant case the Supreme Court will adhere to the principle
laid down in the last named case, wherein the Court said, "The contracts of in-
surance may be said to be interdependent. They can not be regarded singly, or
isolatedly, and the effect of their relation is to create a fund of assurance and
credit, the companies becoming the depositories of the money of the insured,
possessing great power thereby and charged with great responsibility. How
necessary their solvency is, is manifest. On the other hand to the insured, in-
surance is an asset, a basis of credit It is practically a necessity to business
activity and enterprise. It is, therefore, essentially different from ordinary
commercial transactions, and, as we have seen, according to the sense of the
world from the earliest times--certainly the sense of the modem world-is of
the greatest public concern." J. R. B. '28.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PowER OF THE PRESIDENT TO REMOVE APPOINTIVE OFFI-
ciAs.-Where the President removed a postmaster under an Act of Congress
which required the Senate to consent to the appointment and removal of such
officer, held, that this statute was invalid, and the President had the sole power
of removal of all officers appointed by him. Myers v. United States, (U. S.)
71 L. Ed., 27; 47 S. Ct. Rep., 21.
The Court bases its opinion on two general grounds; first, that the general
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